This week, the FCA took centre stage with FT Adviser headlines declaring a global crackdown on “illegal finfluencers.” As part of a coordinated international effort, the regulator claims to have issued dozens of warnings, takedown requests, and cease-and-desist letters—heralding its commitment to protecting consumers from rogue financial promotions online.
Yet, while the FCA polices Instagram accounts abroad, a quieter scandal brews at home.
Thousands of victims of cross-border pension and investment mis-selling have faced regulatory indifference, despite evidence of wrongdoing from within the FCA’s own perimeter. For them, there’s no press release. No “week of action.” Just silence.
🚨 A Trail of Domestic Regulatory Failures
What makes the FCA’s grandstanding especially galling is its chronic failure to enforce its own rules where it matters most: on UK soil, under its direct remit.
1. Perimeter Breaches Ignored:
Regulated firms and appointed representatives have long operated in tandem with unregulated schemes—promoting high-risk, unsuitable investments like unregulated bonds and offshore pensions. The FCA failed to stop this, even when these promotions were disguised as “regulated advice.”
2. Weak Oversight of Appointed Representatives:
Despite admitting for years that the Appointed Representative model is high-risk, the FCA has not enforced effective supervision of these relationships. UK-based firms used their AR networks to push unregulated schemes without meaningful oversight.
3. No Action on Known Risks:
By the mid-2010s, mis-selling involving SIPPs, QROPS, and unregulated investments was widely reported. Yet, the FCA failed to warn the public in time, restrict promotions, or act on red flags—even as harm mounted.
4. Trustee Failures Unchecked:
Offshore trustees and administrators with UK connections repeatedly breached duties, yet the FCA did not investigate or intervene. This includes entities tied to pension transfers involving UK consumers but administered under looser foreign regimes.
5. Ignoring Evidence and Complaints:
Victims submitted detailed complaints, backed by evidence of fraud, forged documentation, and undisclosed commissions. Many heard nothing back. Others were brushed off with vague perimeter defences.
6. No Use of Enforcement Tools:
Despite powers under FSMA (e.g. Section 166 skilled person reviews), the FCA failed to investigate firms involved in these schemes. Even when faced with widespread losses and systemic misconduct, it declined to act.
7. Breach of Consumer Duty and Principles for Business:
The regulator failed to uphold its own Principles for Business—particularly around integrity, fairness, and transparent communication. Victims were misled, exploited, and left unprotected by schemes linked to FCA-regulated entities.
8. Failure to Coordinate Cross-Border Regulation:
In cases involving Malta, the Isle of Man, and offshore life companies, there’s little evidence of real-time collaboration with other regulators. This allowed key players to exploit regulatory gaps and jurisdictional arbitrage while targeting UK savers.
9. Offshore “Death Offices” Allowed to Operate Freely:
The FCA permitted the UK-facing marketing of offshore providers—known for offering hefty commissions and risky products—to continue unchecked. Despite repeated complaints, it failed to investigate or restrict these entities.
🧱 The Perimeter Excuse Wears Thin
The FCA’s favourite defence—“it’s outside our perimeter”—has become a smokescreen. The reality is that these schemes were sold via UK advisers, promoted through UK marketing channels, and transferred from UK pension pots. The victims are UK citizens.
Claiming jurisdictional impotence is no longer credible. The regulator’s statutory objective is to protect consumers. That responsibility doesn’t end at the first sign of offshore complexity.
🎭 Performance vs. Protection
The FCA’s enforcement campaign against finfluencers may make for great optics, but it highlights a troubling trend: swift, visible action on low-hanging fruit, and strategic silence on deeper, more politically inconvenient failings.
It’s easier to chase TikTok scammers than to confront systemic misconduct enabled by the FCA’s own supervisory failures.
Until the regulator acknowledges this, takes responsibility for historic inaction, and compensates those it failed, the damage to its legitimacy will only grow.
🔁 Justice for victims must start at home. Not with hashtags and headlines—but with truth, transparency, and action where it’s long overdue.
Remember: Financial crime isn’t just a numbers game—it’s personal. And the law is on your side.
Case Study: Eight Years of Silence — How the FCA Misled MPs and Failed Victims.
Becky Gittins MP
House of Commons
London
SW1A 0AA
2 June 2025
Our Ref: 250516A
Dear Ms Gittins,
RE: [REDACTED]
Thank you for your email of 16 May on behalf of your constituents and for forwarding the two emails [REDACTED] has provided.
We have been in contact with [REDACTED] since 2017 regarding his pension transfer to Malta. Our supervision team has reviewed his case, and we have responded on a number of occasions to his former MPs. At the time, we explained that the FCA did not have a remit to take any action.
The financial advisor [REDACTED] used was not authorised by the FCA and the information we had was that he was based overseas, as were any impacted customers. [REDACTED] was directed to the Maltese authorities as the correct jurisdiction to pursue his case.
Due to the volume of correspondence from [REDACTED] and the multiple recipients included, we have needed to direct his emails to the Executive Casework Team. We advised [REDACTED] of this at the time and advised that we will only reply to emails when we have anything useful to explain and have encouraged him to share any updates on his litigation case in Malta.
We continue to review all new correspondence from [REDACTED] and, where relevant, we share with the supervision team for review. I hope this is helpful and reassures you that we have looked into [REDACTED]’s case in detail.
Yours sincerely,
Chris Hamilton
Head of Department
External Affairs, Internal Communications and Transparency, FCA
✅ FCA Failings in the Case
- Failure to Warn or Blacklist Known Rogue Entities
• The FCA did not issue public warnings or blacklist certain offshore trustees, advisory firms, or introducers, despite repeated red flags and complaints.
• Firms and individuals with ties to high-risk or fraudulent behaviour continued operating without restriction. - Inadequate Oversight of Introducer Networks and AR Relationships
• UK-facing introducers promoted overseas QROPS schemes involving loosely regulated offshore trustees.
• The FCA failed to monitor or regulate these pipelines effectively, despite its responsibilities around financial promotions and consumer protection. - Neglect of Jurisdictional Risk from Cross-Border Schemes
• The FCA allowed UK pension transfers to be routed through intermediaries and schemes based in high-risk jurisdictions.
• This represents a systemic failure to prevent jurisdictional arbitrage that left UK consumers without effective safeguards. - Failure to Protect Consumers Under the Perimeter Framework
• Although offshore schemes operated beyond UK borders, the affected clients were UK-based and misled by UK-facing actors.
• The FCA leaned on perimeter excuses rather than actively protecting consumers or cooperating with foreign regulators. - Insufficient Response to Complaints and Intelligence Submissions
• Detailed complaints and documentary evidence were submitted to the FCA, highlighting undisclosed commissions and misleading practices.
• The FCA failed to respond decisively, enabling prolonged misconduct and deepening consumer losses. - Regulatory Capture and Indifference to Offshore Life Offices
• Serious misconduct linked to international life companies marketing to UK savers — including opaque commissions and unsuitable product structures — went unaddressed.
• These firms used offshore bases to avoid FCA scrutiny while operating de facto in the UK market. - Failure to Enforce the Principles for Businesses
• The FCA’s own Principles for Businesses (particularly Principles 1, 6, and 7 — integrity, treating customers fairly, and clear communication) were breached by multiple actors.
• No enforcement or corrective action was taken to uphold these standards. - Lack of Coordination with Overseas Regulators
• There is no indication of meaningful cooperation between the FCA and relevant overseas regulators.
• This regulatory siloing allowed those responsible for consumer harm to avoid accountability across jurisdictions.
About Get SAFE
Get SAFE (Support After Financial Exploitation) was born from a simple truth: too many victims of financial abuse are left to suffer in silence.
We exist in memory of Ian Davis—for the ones who did everything right, only to be failed by the systems they trusted. We know that behind every vanished pension, every ignored complaint, and every stonewalled letter is a person—frightened, exhausted, and too often alone.
Get SAFE offers more than sympathy. We offer structure, support, and solidarity.
We provide a voice where there’s been silence, and clarity where there’s been confusion.
We stand beside those who have been exploited, not just to help them recover—but to help them reclaim their story and rebuild their future.
Because financial justice is not a luxury.
It’s a human right.
If you or someone you know has been affected by financial exploitation, we are here.
You are not alone.
Learn more at: Get SAFE (Support After Financial Exploitation).
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